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Gas on the Fire: Great Power Alliances
and Petrostate Aggression1,2
INWOOK KIM
University of Hong Kong
AND
JACKSON WOODS
The George Washington University
What causes petro-aggression? Conventional wisdom maintains that the re-
gime type of petrostates has significant effects on the likelihood that pet-
rostates will launch revisionist militarized interstate disputes (MIDs). While
domestic politics is an important factor that might explain the motivation
and behavioral patterns of a petrostate, it says little about the international
environment in which a petrostate decides to initiate conflicts. One signifi-
cant factor that presents opportunities and constraints for petro-aggression
is a great power alliance. In essence, the great power has strong incentives
not to upset the relationship with its client petrostate ally for both strategic
and economic reasons and, hence, tends not to oppose military adventur-
ism by its ally. Consequently, the petrostate’s anticipation of great power in-
action or even protection for its revisionist policy creates a moral hazard
problem. Overall, by offering favorable circumstances, a great power alli-
ance has a positive effect on petro-aggression. Although not without ca-
veats, our large-n model and case study bear out this conclusion.
Keywords: oil, great power, alliance, petro-aggression, oil state
Recent work has uncovered a strong correlation between oil abundance, regime
type, and propensity to launch militarized interstate disputes (MIDs) (Colgan
2010), defying the popular depiction of petrostates as victims of international
competition for resources (Homer-Dixon 1999; Klare 2001). What makes petros-
tates3 potentially aggressive actors in the international system? Is oil “devil’s excre-
ment” for international peace, or are its effects more contingent?
We argue that the presence of a great power alliance significantly increases pet-
rostates’ proneness to conflicts for two reasons. First, the strategic and commercial
values unique to oil induce great powers to avoid upsetting their relationships with
petrostates. Second, a great power alliance provides petrostates with further
1The authors thank Brandon Bartels, Jeff Colgan, Charles Glaser, Seok-Joon Kim, and Eric Lawrence for their
thoughtful comments. Earlier drafts were presented at the 2013 Annual Conference of the Midwest Political
Science Association, Virtual Conference on Resource Politics in 2013, and the 2014 Annual Conference of the
International Studies Association.
2Data for the replication of results presented in this paper, along with explanatory materials, may be obtained at
https://dataverse.harvard.edu/dataset.xhtml?persistentId¼doi%3A10.7910%2FDVN%2FDBWPVK.
3A petrostate is defined as a state whose oil exports constitute more than 10 percent of its GDP (Colgan 2010).
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incentives to behave aggressively through deterrence, entrapment, and enhanced
interest effects. Overall, petrostates allied with great powers anticipate that their
great power allies will acquiesce to, or even support, their revisionist policies, as
long as the core interests of the great power are not threatened. The combination
of oil and alliance creates a particularly strong moral hazard problem for petros-
tates allied with great powers when pursuing disputes with neighbors.
Our argument shares the widely held view that oil’s effects are generally condi-
tional, not absolute (Ross 2015). We acknowledge and build on the argument that
petro-aggression is contingent upon the presence of a revolutionary government
(Colgan 2010, 2013a). Petro-aggression, however, is a complex phenomenon that
cannot be explained by a single condition, and the posited revolutionary variable
should be regarded as a useful starting point rather than the final say in compre-
hending how and why petrostates initiate conflicts. Our paper expands this discussion
by shifting the analysis to the international context in which petrostates launch MIDs.
Petro-aggression has historically affected international security in consequential
ways, most demonstratively in the Middle East, and oil continues to be at the center of
contemporary militarized disputes between states in Africa and Central Asia. By high-
lighting international causes for petro-aggression, our analysis suggests several policy
principles for great powers to moderate their petrostate allies’ impulse for revisionist
policies.Great power policies should focus primarily on lessening the moral hazard
problem that a mixture of oil and great power alliance generates. Great powers may be
well advised to make public and explicit that their commitments to oil-state allies are
limited to conflicts of a defensive nature, exercise their leverage in bilateral arms trade
or multilateral security bodies, and make the costs of aggression specific and bigger.
This paper is structured as follows. The next section critically reviews the litera-
ture on petro-aggression. The following section outlines the theoretical framework,
illustrating how a blend of oil abundance and great power alliance foments petro-
aggression. The next two sections test our theory using a large-n evaluation and a
case study that generally bears out our argument. Our case is Iran’s occupation of
the Abu Musa and Tunbs islands in 1971. Absent revolutionary government, Iran’s
revisionist policy was strongly facilitated by a favorable regional environment cre-
ated by the combination of its oil wealth and alliance with the United States. The
last section concludes, discussing policy implications of our findings.
Bringing in the International Factors
Oil has long been regarded as “the prize” (Yergin 1992) to capture, causing a
quest for oil to frequently take violent forms. Although a link between oil and in-
terstate conflicts is intuitive, only recently did scholars begin to produce system-
atic studies examining the role of oil in interstate conflicts (Klare 2001; Acemoglu
et al. 2012; Colgan 2013a; Glaser 2013; Hughes and Long 2015). Conventional
wisdom according to the so-called resource war literature maintains that petros-
tates are victims of international competition for oil who suffer from an unfortu-
nate fate imposed by their comparative advantage: oil abundance. However,
statistical evidence lends little support to this victimization narrative (de Soysa,
Gartzke, and Grete Lie 2009; Colgan 2010, 2013b). Instead, petrostates engage in
94 percent more MIDs as aggressors than non-petrostates (Colgan 2010), thereby
making such petro-aggression the most significant relationship between oil and
international security.
Oil’s effects on a petrostate’s aggressive impulse are diverse, however. On one
hand, oil increases the petrostate’s proneness to conflict by insulating the leader
from domestic opposition and increasing military capabilities with its oil income.
At the same time, however, oil generates strong incentives to respect the status
quo international system that makes the complex and lucrative oil trade possible.
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What determines which incentives dominate? Colgan maintains that the nature
of domestic politics determines whether leaders of oil-exporting nations have ag-
gressive, risk-acceptant preferences, and that petrostates led by “revolutionary”
leaders are dramatically more aggressive and launch MIDs at more than three
times the rate of comparable non-petrostates (Colgan 2010, 2013a). Two charac-
teristics associated with revolutionary government account for this higher propen-
sity to initiate a conflict. First, habits and skills of solving political conflict by force
are more prevalent among revolutionary leaders. Second, revolutionary govern-
ments are more likely to enjoy the removal of domestic constraints on the execu-
tive. Overall, the combination of oil and revolutionary government is a “toxic mix
for international peace and security.”
We contend that this revision to the existing debate remains incomplete. Most
problematically, the international environment stays constant and exogenous in the
domestic-oriented analysis. In reality, petrostates operate under varying sets of inter-
national opportunities and constraints, which in turn deeply intervene in a petros-
tate’s calculus for launching MIDs. Therefore, while a mix of oil and revolutionary
history may make a petrostate particularly reckless and violent, the surrounding in-
ternational context can suppress or amplify the recklessness. For instance, few
doubted Saddam Hussein’s sharp belligerence, but Saddam’s recklessness also had
been moderated on several occasions by the broader strategic environment, which
he perceived as capable of inflicting larger costs on his regime.4
The international contexts of petrostates’ foreign relations significantly shape at
least three dimensions relevant to petro-aggression. First, the international context
informs a petrostate’s assessment about the severity of potential military repercus-
sions from its aggression. More specifically, military repercussions correspond to
the willingness and capability of the target, its allies, or other states to punish the
planned petro-aggression. Repercussions can take a variety of forms, such as escala-
tion of tension, reputational costs, retaliatory attacks, and others. Severe military re-
percussions are anticipated to reduce the incentives for petro-aggression, whereas
anticipation of inaction or an inconsequential military backlash will create added
incentives for aggression. For instance, Saddam Hussein’s decision to invade Kuwait
in 1990 was partly driven by a misperceived green light from the United States as
succinctly stated in Ambassador April Glaspie’s famous quote: “We have no opinion
on the Arab–Arab conflicts, like your border disagreement with Kuwait” (Sciolino
and Gordon 1990). Scholars believe that a firm and explicit threat of punishment
could have prevented Saddam from launching his offensive (Mearsheimer and
Walt 2003). For rational leaders concerned with regime survival and stability, mili-
tary backlash is a key factor to consider before launching a militarized dispute.
Second, a petrostate’s foreign relations can amplify or mitigate the possible eco-
nomic backlash from its aggressive behavior. Initiating international conflict in
pursuit of revisionist policies can incur substantial financial opportunity costs in
the short run, risk overseas assets, and harm the long-run global reliance on oil
(Colgan 2010). Problematically, these costs are assumed to apply equally to all
petrostates. This does not necessarily hold in reality, especially regarding short-
run costs and overseas assets. Rather, the likelihood or severity of repercussions is
a function of the relationship with trade partners and host states of the foreign as-
sets. US-friendly oil states, such as Saudi Arabia, pre-1979 Iran, or Nigeria, hardly
faced economic backlash from the pursuit of limited revisionist policies in their
respective regions. Rather, what inflicted economic and financial costs were
mostly the aggressions by more hostile petrostates such as post-1979 Iran or
Saddam’s Iraq.
4See Byman, Pollack, and Waxman (1998) for more detailed description of such cases such as the 1975 Algier
Agreement and backing down from a second invasion of Kuwait in 1994.
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Third, the international context can affect a petrostate’s military power itself.
Domestic-level analysis cannot capture oil’s differentiating impact on making a
petrostate “more capable of engaging in militarized disputes should it choose to
do so” (Colgan 2010, 669), overlooking the unequal distribution of arms-purchas-
ing power and access to cutting-edge weapons systems across petrostates. In partic-
ular, the international environment is directly relevant to the latter. The most
advanced weapons systems are produced only in select advanced industrialized
countries, and decisions to sell them abroad are usually based on a combination
of commercial incentives, politics, and strategic calculations. Petrostates with pref-
erential access to advanced weapons systems, other things being equal, are likely
to possess greater military capability.
The variations in military repercussions, economic backlashes, and military
power are primarily caused by the petrostate’s foreign relations under a specific
international setting. These international dimensions, in turn, should alter the
likelihood of petro-aggression in significant ways, in addition to the consequences
of revolutionary government. And yet the interaction between the international
environment and petrostate behavior remains to be theorized and systematically
tested with available data.5
“Gas on the Fire”: Why Petrostates with Great Power Allies are More Revisionist
International politics and the relationships between states may impact MID initia-
tion by petrostates in a number of theoretically distinct ways. We focus here on al-
liances with great powers, the states that clearly occupy the first rank in total
military and economic power in the international system at any given time.6 Our
theory suggests that oil states enjoy certain advantages that, in combination with
great power alliances, give them greater latitude for aggression than other states.
In the simplest terms, these factors create a serious moral hazard problem that
emboldens a petrostate “to behave aggressively because it is insulated from the
risks of its own actions” (Benson 2012). Petrostates are less likely to face intra-alli-
ance consequences for their actions and may even pass part of the burden to their
patrons.7
The following section elaborates this theory. First, we offer two characteristics of
oil wealth that enhance petrostates’ importance to great powers: importers’ re-
quirement for a stable oil market and strategic competition for access to friendly
oil among great powers. Second, we provide three alliance factors explaining why
oil states allied with great powers will enjoy further incentives to behave aggres-
sively. In sum, those oil states allied with great powers will tend to make more
threats because they are freer to do so.
From Oil to Aggression
Oil has been long regarded as a strategic commodity; it is indispensable in run-
ning an industrialized economy and modern military and has few substitutes in
the short run. The uniqueness of oil as a resource naturally has created strategic
interests among great powers, which in turn responded with varying levels of
5De Soysa, Gartzke, and Grete Lie (2009) are an exception. They argue that great powers are likely to tolerate
petrostates’ pursuit of revisionist foreign policies because the cost of restraining petrostates can be considerable.
This analysis suffers from two weaknesses. First, de Soysa, Gartzke and Grete Lie do not specify what these “costs” of
restraining petrostates are. Second, they implicitly assume that great powers provide an equal safety net to all
petrostates.
6This definition of great power is functionally similar to the concept of polarity. See Waltz (1979), Mearsheimer
(2001), and Glaser (2010).
7Moral hazard problems within alliances have been constantly visited by security alliance scholars. See Snyder
(1984), Yuen (2009), and Benson (2012).
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military readiness (Rovner and Talmadge 2014). This crucial dependence on oil
recently drew scholars to the oil-induced moral hazard problem (de Soysa,
Gartzke, and Grete Lie 2009), but the cause of great powers’ inability to restrain
petrostates’ revisionist policies remains unspecified. Rather, the strategic value of
oil is simply assumed and asserted. This section fills this gap by laying out two pri-
mary concerns that underpin great powers’ interests in petrostates.
First, great powers need to ensure a stable supply of oil at a reasonable price.
For an oil-dependent great power, maintaining a friendly oil-export policy is vital
for its domestic and international interests. Disruption in the oil supply or even
unanticipated price increases can have immediate and damaging effects on ad-
vanced industrialized economies, as the oil crises of the 1970s spectacularly dem-
onstrated.8 Even more serious are the potential effects on modern militaries since
“armies, navies, and air forces that do not have enough oil simply cannot function
effectively if pitted against an adversary with plenty of it” (Kelanic 2012).9 In addi-
tion, even great powers with relatively high domestic oil production will still have
a strong interest in ensuring a stable oil market as long as they have a stake in
global economic stability or important allies who are themselves import-depen-
dent. An autarkic great power might be imagined, but a great power with little in-
terest in stable and affordable world oil supplies seems unlikely in practice.
Naturally, petrostates also suffer major distress from oil disruptions, as their
economies rely predominantly on secure energy exports. In fact, exporters benefit
economically from supply reductions only under stringent conditions: when re-
ductions are followed by a more than proportionate price increase and sustained
by effective coordination among participating oil exporters.10 These are not easily
attainable conditions for most oil exporters, and historically exporters have been
cautious not to upset the world’s long-run dependence on oil by creating short-
run shocks.
However, despite exporters’ caution about utilizing oil coercively, the risk-
averse importer’s anxiety about a possible oil crisis remains quite another matter.
Although the chance of an oil shock at any given moment may be low, oil impor-
ters have strong incentives to forestall the possibility of an oil crisis as comprehen-
sively as possible.11 In practice, these incentives may discourage oil-dependent
great powers from intervening in petrostates’ foreign policies as long as they do
not pose threats to securing a reliable oil supply at a reasonable price or other im-
portant foreign policy objectives.12
Second, great powers seek not only to secure a safe oil supply but also to deny
their adversaries access to oil. Oil’s non-renewability and irreplaceability makes
the inter-state competition for oil exhibit zero-sum-game dynamics, especially in
the short and medium run. Unlike other traded commodities, therefore, loss of
imported oil to rival states can inflict significant financial costs through price
8From 1973 to 1975, for instance, GDP fell by 6 percent and unemployment doubled to 9 percent in the United
States as a result of OPEC’s oil embargo. The adverse ramifications of the embargo extended to US grand strategy
when oil-dependent allies such as the European Community and Japan deviated from United States policy and pub-
licly endorsed the Arab position in November 1973. See Hamilton (1983).
9A historical example would be the severe military disadvantages that oil-deficient Germany and Japan faced
during the Second World War against the oil-abundant United States and its allies. See Yergin (1992).
10Effective coordination among oil producers is notoriously difficult because of incentives to cheat and a lack of
monitoring and punishment mechanisms. Moreover, Saudi Arabia has typically been willing and able to maintain
oil prices during temporary disruptions by utilizing its own spare capacity, which serves long-run Saudi interests.
11Note that most security scholars view states’ concern over future oil crises as essentially unwarranted (Gholz
and Press 2010). For the purposes of our argument, however, it matters only that importers worry about the possibil-
ity of such a crisis, not whether they are ultimately correct or mistaken in doing so.
12Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in 1990 is exactly the type of petrostate aggression that great powers would never tol-
erate, as the successful annexation of Kuwait would give Iraq market power roughly equal to that of Saudi Arabia in
the oil trade.
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hikes or military disadvantages when supplies are cut, neither of which can be eas-
ily overcome in the near term.
The strategic pressure to deny an adversary’s access to oil has two implications for
great power–petrostate relations. To begin with, even great powers with sufficient oil
reserves have a vested interest in keeping petrostates close in order to deny potential
adversaries’ access to oil. The value of denial varies with the adversary’s oil depen-
dence since a comprehensive denial of the adversary’s access to oil is highly effective
in hampering its capability to carry out military operations. The most successful ex-
ample of such a denial strategy is found in the Allied forces’ operations against oil-de-
pendent Germany and Japan during the Second World War (Yergin 1992; Kelanic
2012). The Soviet Union’s interest in the Middle East during the early Cold War also
partly rested upon the West’s reliance on the region’s oil since Soviet oil resources
were already adequate domestically (Ross 1981). Overall, the strategic value of having
petrostates as allies, or at least keeping them out of the adversary’s camp, extends
even to those great powers with sufficient internal reserves.
The second implication of denial’s value is the ability of petrostates to exploit the
strategic rivalry between great powers. As part of a denial strategy, great powers have an
incentive to prevent a friendly petrostate’s defection to its adversary, as well as to en-
courage the defection of its adversary’s petrostate allies. For petrostates, these great
power rivalries offer the chance to extract additional policy autonomy or other bene-
fits. For instance, when the Kennedy administration showed reluctance to issue a sec-
ond credit package to Iran at a reduced interest rate, the Shah approached the Soviet
Union and signed a trade credit agreement in 1965, sparking a series of credit agree-
ments with the USSR and the East European bloc (al-Saud 2003, 24–5).13 The Shah’s
brief rapprochement with the USSR paid off when the United States responded with a
second US$50 million slice of credit at a reduced 5 percent interest rate in 1967.
Overall, the rationale for Soviet and American competitive loan offers to Iran in this
period reflected attempts to undermine one another’s influence. This is exactly the
type of exploitation of great power divisions that we would expect.
Alliance Dynamics
The two aforementioned characteristics of oil wealth—its strategic necessity and
conversely the value of denial—provide reason for us to believe that petrostates
have considerable freedom of movement in the international system. Two ques-
tions remain, however. First, why should alliances matter? Even unallied oil states
can benefit from great powers’ interest in maintaining oil flows and exploit the di-
visions between great powers. Second, why should oil states make threats more of-
ten? We have discussed how great powers have little interest in restraint, but this
is not necessarily the same as saying that oil states allied with great powers will
make threats more frequently. To answer these two questions, we suggest three
linking mechanisms whereby alliances, in combination with the enhanced auton-
omy noted earlier, can increase the incidence of oil-state aggression.
The first mechanism is deterrence. According to this logic, petrostates ally with
great powers out of a desire to gain security benefits. In so doing, they become
less vulnerable to retaliation from other states. If an oil state takes aggressive ac-
tion, it can be confident that other states will be less likely to retaliate against it
given both the external balancing power of its ally and the enhanced internal bal-
ancing capabilities offered by arms sales, joint training, and the like.
The second mechanism is entrapment (Snyder 1984). In this case, an alliance
provides an opportunity for a petrostate to deliberately involve its ally in its con-
flicts. Exploiting the security guarantee made by its great power ally, an oil state
13By early 1966, economic credits extended from the Soviet Union to Iran totaled US$346 million. In 1967, a
$110 million Soviet–Iranian arms deal was announced, too.
236 Gas on the Fire: Great Power Alliances and Petrostate Aggression
D
ow
nloaded from
 https://academ
ic.oup.com
/isp/article-abstract/17/3/231/2684517 by Singapore M
anagem
ent U
niversity user on 18 June 2019
may initiate or escalate a crisis hoping to force its ally to aid it or risk major dis-
ruption or harm to the client state. This effect lowers the expected cost of war
and encourages the use of force in a broader range of cases.
Finally, alliances matter because of enhanced interests. In short, an allied great
power will face the same pressures noted in our discussion of the effects of oil,
only more so. These effects help explain why oil states with alliances might have
more freedom of action to take revisionist measures than non-allied oil states.
First, as prospect theory suggests, states highly value that which they have, fearing
losses more than they value gains. A secure oil-exporting ally is a major asset, and
one whose loss would be keenly felt. In combination with the potential for oil
states to exploit divisions between great powers noted earlier, great powers will
tend to exert themselves to maintain friendly relations with oil-state allies more
than they will to maintain good relations with less closely aligned countries, even
petrostates. Moreover, the volume of trade and commercial arms ties is likely to
be much higher between allies. The inherent value of such trade, as well as insti-
tutional interests within the great power’s government, will promote forgiveness
of foreign adventurism by the oil-state ally.
In sum, great powers will face stronger pressure to defend an ally than to stop it
from coercing others and indeed often lack leverage in the latter case since en-
dangering the alliance could harm their own interests. Anticipating inaction from
its great power ally and protection from a possible backlash, the petrostate more
freely uses military force to coerce other states.
Hypotheses and Results14
We have posited that two aspects of oil wealth pressure great powers to permit pet-
rostates’ pursuit of revisionist goals: the economic necessity of stable and afford-
able oil supplies and the related strategic desire to deny an adversary’s access to
that oil. These mechanisms rationalize the great power’s reluctance and toler-
ance, which would not exist absent the client’s oil abundance. In addition, alli-
ance dynamics further incentivize great power acquiescence through deterrence,
entrapment, and enhanced interests effects, generating a moral hazard problem
that promotes aggression. Consequently, we expect that petrostates allied with
great powers will be more belligerent than non-allied petrostates.
We formalize this expectation and the major theoretical alternative in the fol-
lowing hypotheses:
Hypotheses 1: Oil states with great power alliances are more likely to initiate re-
visionist MIDs than oil states without such alliances. (Incentives to Initiate)
Hypotheses 2: Oil states with great power alliances will be less likely to initiate
revisionist MIDs than oil states without such alliances. (Alliance Restraint)
In both cases, the null hypothesis is that great power alliances have no measur-
able relationship to MID initiation.
To investigate these hypotheses, we construct a data set based on Colgan’s (2010)
data. By doing so, we can include his revolutionary leadership variables as controls
in our own models. Colgan’s data consist of MID counts taken from the
Correlates of War project for 170 countries between the years 1945 and 2001,
along with a suite of control variables. To this we added data on alliances and mil-
itary capabilities drawn from the Correlates of War project.15 We then estimated a
14Data for the replication of results presented in this paper, along with explanatory materials, may be obtained
at https://dataverse.harvard.edu/dataset.xhtml?persistentId¼doi%3A10.7910%2FDVN%2FDBWPVK.
15Correlates of War Formal Alliance data set, version 3.03, and National Material Capabilities data set, version
4.0. Available at http://www.correlatesofwar.org/Datasets.htm (accessed January 7, 2015).
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random-effects longitudinal Poisson (event-count) model to measure the alliance
variables’ relationship to the incidence of revisionist MIDs (Revisionist MID). The
unit of analysis is the country-year and the total number of observations is 6,945.
Dependent Variable
The dependent variable in our model is Revisionist MID. Its distribution is
weighted heavily toward zero: few countries experience a militarized dispute in a
given year. The MIDs have been categorized according to which state had revi-
sionist aims or was seen to be “attacking,” not according to which state may have
fired the first shot. This matches Colgan’s analysis and better reflects our inten-
tion to measure whether states with alliances are more likely to take aggressive ac-
tion toward other states. Below we show the dependent variable’s distribution
(Table 1).16 The outlier is Iran in 1987 with 23 MIDs, which we drop from the sta-
tistical model. Doing so does not affect our primary result.17
Independent Variables
With three exceptions, we include all of Colgan’s independent variables alongside
our alliance variables. We omit the Major Power and Percent Muslim variables,
which are predominantly captured in other variables and make no substantive dif-
ference in our results. In addition, we add Military Expenditures and Military
Personnel from the Correlates of War National Material Capabilities data set to re-
place Colgan’s GDP measure, better capturing states’ military capacity and leaders’
likely expectations about their ability to win military disputes.18
We next include our key variables of interest, which identify states with great
power alliances. Alliances as defined by the COW data include mutual defense
pacts, neutrality and non-aggression agreements, and ententes that obligate
Table 1. Dependent variable distribution
Initiated MIDs Frequency Percentage Cumulative
0 5,923 85.28 85.28
1 793 11.42 96.70
2 171 2.46 99.16
3 34 0.49 99.65
4 12 0.17 99.83
5 4 0.06 99.88
7 3 0.04 99.93
8 1 0.01 99.94
9 2 0.03 99.97
11 1 0.01 99.99
23 1 0.01 100.00
Total 6,945 100.00
16Given the skewed nature of the distribution, we also fitted a logit model with a dichotomous dependent vari-
able coded for initiation in any given year (not shown). This model accorded with the results presented in what
follows.
17Including or excluding 1987 Iran does affect the result of Model 2 presented subsequently. However, two im-
portant points must be made. First, we believe Model 1 is the best specification available for our theory and present
Model 2 only as a suggested robustness check on our results. Second, examination of the empirical cases recorded
for Iran in 1987 indicates that many of these MIDs involved countries well outside the region with little potential
for actual armed conflict or escalation, including South Korea, Norway, Japan, Liberia, Sweden, and others. Empty
threats, understood by both sides to be empty, do not challenge our theoretical argument. For these reasons, we
are comfortable excluding this outlier observation from both models.
18We thank an anonymous reviewer for this suggestion.
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consultation in times of armed crisis or attack. A Great Power Alliance is defined
as an alliance of any type with either the United States or the Soviet Union be-
tween the years 1945 and 1991 and an alliance of any type with the United States
in the period 1991–2001. In total, 2,918 of the total country-years had a great
power alliance present (42 percent of the total), though only 211 of these alli-
ances involved oil states.
Finally, the Great Power Alliance variable is interacted with the Oil State variable
to examine those cases in which alliances and oil wealth coexist. This independent
variable is of greatest interest to us since it represents the relationship between hav-
ing both oil and a great power alliance on propensity to be involved in a revisionist
MID. We also include an interaction term for Alliances and Radical Leadership in
order to control for the possibility that some unknown process links the alliances
with Colgan’s radical leadership factor. All controls are listed in Table 2.
Results and Interpretation
The model results are displayed subsequently in Table 3. Model 1 is our base
model, while Model 2 presents a robustness check described in what follows.19
Our Model 1 results generally support Hypothesis 1. The interaction between
Great Power Alliance and Oil State is significant at the standard 5 percent threshold
(p¼ 0.018) and has a positive effect. However, Great Power Alliance has no signifi-
cant effect on its own or in combination with other variables. This finding offers
support for our theory: oil states will be freer to initiate conflicts owing to their le-
verage in the alliance relationship.
Predicted probabilities of involvement in a revisionist MID offer one relatively
direct interpretation of the model. These probabilities show that alliances have a
notable effect only when oil states are involved and that this effect favors conflict
(Figure 1). For example, the average predicted probability of involvement in one
or more revisionist MIDs for any given oil state rises from 0.096 to 0.134 when a
great power alliance is present. This indicates a 40 percent increase in the likeli-
hood that oil states in the data set will undertake a revisionist MID in any given
year compared to oil states without alliances. Put another way, we would expect
an oil state without an alliance to initiate a revisionist MID about once per decade
while those with alliances undertake one approximately every seven or eight years.
Table 2. Independent variables
Variable Unit/description (per country-year unless noted)
Great power alliance Dummy variable for alliance
Oil state Dummy variable (oil> 10% of state GDP)
Radical leader Dummy variable for radical leadership
Allianceoil state Dummy variable for interaction effect
Alliance radical leader Dummy variable for interaction effect
Radical leaderoil state Dummy variable for interaction effect
Ln military personnel Natural log of total military personnel in millions
Ln military expenditures Natural log of total military expenditures in billions of US dollars
Ln population Natural log of population in thousands
Polity IV Composite Polity IV score ranging from10 to 10
Borders Number of contiguous territorial borders
Enduring rivalry Count variable for rivalries in each year in period 1945–1989
Cold war Dummy variable for involvement in an enduring rivalry
Region ID Eight dummy variables for world region
Peace years 3-knot spline function for number of years since last MID
19Missing data result predominately from missing entries for the Polity IV variable (560 missing observations)
and Radical Leader variable (538 missing observations).
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For non-oil states, great power alliances have no significant effect on the initia-
tion of conflict. Note that oil states without alliances are generally less likely to ini-
tiate revisionist MIDs compared to states in general, which matches Colgan’s
finding on the matter. However, once they enter a great power alliance, there is
no statistically significant difference between oil states and other states. In a sense,
great power alliances “cancel out” oil states’ propensity to avoid revisionist MIDs.
Last, we must consider the possibility that great power alliances may actually be
defensive responses to a state’s ongoing conflicts or residence in a “dangerous
neighborhood,” which would reverse the causal arrow of our argument. Model 1
controls for this possibility by including a country’s number of neighbors and con-
secutive years without a MID as controls. However, we fitted an alternative model
(Model 2) that replaced Borders and Peace Years with a more direct threat to states’
security: Enduring Rivalries.20 When the count of each state’s enduring rivalries is
included as a control variable, the results do not substantively change, and the
Table 3. Model results
Model 1 Model 2
Great power alliance 0.078 0.129
(0.121) (0.124)
Oil state 0.693*** 0.690***
(0.172) (0.174)
Radical leader 0.354** 0.398*
(0.112) (0.112)
Allianceoil state 0.469* 0.374†
(0.198) (0.200)
Alliance radical leader 0.163 0.117
(.165) (0.165)
Radical leaderoil state 0.840*** 0.896***
(0.210) (0.215)
Ln military expenditures 0.085** 0.114***
(0.031) (0.031)
Ln military personnel 0.129* 0.125*
(0.060) (0.063)
Ln population 0.030 0.085
(0.082) (0.085)
Polity IV 0.008 0.007
(0.007) (0.008)
Cold war 0.153 0.044
(0.079) (0.080)
Borders 0.089***
(0.021)
Enduring rivalry 0.292***
(0.049)
_cons 1.881* 2.235*
(0.888) (0.956)
N 6,009 6,009
Standard errors shown in parentheses.
Regional dummies and years of peace spline omitted.
*p< 0.05.
**p< 0.01.
***p< 0.001.
†p< 0.10.
20See especially Klein et al. (2006), whose data we used in performing the statistical analysis. Only rivalries classi-
fied as enduring in all versions of the data were included. For prior research into enduring rivalries, see, among
others, Goertz and Diehl (1993) and Colaresi and Thompson (2002).
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interaction between great power alliances and oil remains significant at the 10
percent level (p¼ 0.061).
Unsurprisingly, since rivalries are actually defined in terms of dyadic MID in-
volvement, the Enduring Rivalry variable is highly significant with a positive effect.
Given the possible circularity of using MID involvement to explain revisionist
MIDs, we tend to favor Model 1. Nonetheless, if alliances were primarily responses
to state’s ongoing security challenges, we would expect the Great Power
Alliance Oil State interaction result from Model 1 to be spurious and disappear
once the underlying cause was introduced as a control. Although the effect is
somewhat weakened in Model 2, this is not the case. Moreover, a simple cross tab-
ulation confirms that most states join great power alliances absent any enduring
rivalries (2,295 of 2,866 alliance observations) and that most states with enduring
rivalries forgo great power alliances (720 of 1,291 rivalry observations). The real
world is complex; it is possible that some great power alliances are defensive prod-
ucts of states’ dangerous environments while most are not.
On the whole, our data provide support for Hypothesis 1 (Incentives to Initiate)
but no support for our alternative hypothesis (Alliance Restraint). We now turn to
a preliminary case study in order to identify the mechanisms that may underpin
our quantitative finding.
Case Study: Iran’s Occupation of Abu Musa and the Tunbs Islands in 1971
This section analyzes how Iran’s alliance relationship with the United States cre-
ated a permissive environment for Iran’s unilateral decision to occupy Greater
and Lesser Tunbs and Abu Musa21 in November 1971. The Shah’s regime falls far
short of being revolutionary in the way he seized power and had run the
0
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0.18
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Non-oil state, no alliance
Average Probability of Revisionist MID
Figure 1. Predicted probabilities.
21Unlike Tunbs, Iran and Britain, with the consent of Sharjah, entered into a memorandum of understanding
regarding Abu Musa, which defined and regulated Iran and Sharjah’s respective areas of interest. The negotiated
settlement came only at the last minute, however, which still leaves the question of on what grounds Iran antici-
pated US tolerance toward its revisionist policy vis-a`-vis Abu Musa.
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country.22 Methodologically, Iran’s case therefore helps avoid the confounding
factor by isolating alliance factors from Colgan’s “revolutionary leadership”
variable.
Background
The Greater and Lesser Tunbs and Abu Musa are three small islands located near
the Strait of Hormuz (Figure 2). Since Britain took control of the islands in 1903–
1904, Iran made repeated yet unsuccessful attempts to negotiate the ownership of
the islands with its British counterpart. When Prime Minister Wilson announced
in 1968 that Britain would no longer honor UK defense commitments east of Suez
by 1971, the Shah’s territorial claims on these disputed islands resurfaced again.23
Although British diplomacy “pushed mightily for a settlement” (Mobley 2003, 644)
between the Shah and Ras al-Khaimah and Sharjah—two small British protected
sheikhdoms that laid claim to the islands in 1971—Britain ultimately failed to re-
solve the sovereignty issue. In the end, Iran invaded the islands on November 30,
1971, the last day of the United Kingdom’s treaty obligation to defend them.
Iran’s claim to the islands had three dimensions. First, there was a genuine
sense of historical injustice that these islands were “unjustly seized” by British impe-
rialists. Retaking them was seen almost as a historic mission by the domestic public,
effectively tying the Shah’s hands (al-Saud 2003, 84). Second, by overlooking
the Strait of Hormuz, these islands carried increased geostrategic and military value;
Iran’s entire oil exports must go through the strait whereby Iran’s entire oil ex-
ports, along with significant Gulf crudes, pass each day, thereby making the security
and safety of the passage a national concern for Iran. Third, thanks to huge oil
revenues and its large population, Iran had by 1971 developed an aspiration
Figure 2. Greater and Lesser Tunb and Abu Musa Islands.
22Colgan (2010) codes government as revolutionary based on two criteria: (1) whether the power transition to
the current regime was based on either use of arms or occurrence of mass demonstration and (2) whether the gov-
ernment implemented radical domestic changes. The Shah was installed by foreign powers via Operation Ajax in
1953, automatically disqualifying the Shah’s government as revolutionary. Also, political and societal changes intro-
duced under his rule were far from being radical or revolutionary.
23The history of the dispute goes back further and is beyond the scope of this article. For a detailed narrative
on the history of these islands, see Mehr (1997).
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to become a regional hegemon.24 The scheduled British withdrawal from
the region, Iran’s growing military advantage vis-a`-vis neighboring states, and the
Shah’s revisionist stance toward the islands “were all related and reflected
the Shah’s goal of making Iran the preeminent force in the Persian Gulf” (Bill
1988, 198).
US–Iran Relations in 1971
Despite the rationales to retake the islands, the Shah had to evaluate the adverse
consequences, particularly the strong and unavoidable opposition from the Arab
states. From Iran’s point of view, the resistance had to be either mitigated or re-
main isolated. Under the context of US emergence as a replacement hegemon,
this was decisively helped by two factors—Iranian oil resources and the US–Iran
military alliance—that forged Iranian anticipation of US tolerance toward its lim-
ited revisionist aims.
Iranian Oil
The global oil market underwent a fundamental transformation in the 1960s.
With accelerating demand increases, the market was no longer defined by “supply
surplus,” and naturally, Iran’s position as an oil producer was empowered vis-a`-vis
the United States via two mechanisms. First, changes in the oil market increased
the importance to the US of denying Soviet access to Iranian oil. Particularly with
US spare production capacity (held by the Texas Railroad Commission) rapidly
depleting, the strategic imperative to protect the largest Gulf state from Soviet in-
fluence was stronger than ever. To make matters worse, the Soviet threat concomi-
tantly loomed larger, as the Soviet Union expressed more interest in Gulf oil as
an additional supply source for domestic industries and its satellite states in
Eastern Europe (Ross 1981). Indeed, the Soviet Union was expanding its influ-
ence in Egypt, Iraq, and India in the early 1970s, encircling US “friends” in the re-
gion (Gause 1985). These developments raised alarms in the United States, as a
loss of Iran to the Soviets would constitute a “major threat to the security of the
entire Middle East” (Randall 2005) and would “wipe out the benefits which we
had received from the Marshall Plan and NATO” (Cohen 2005, 32).
Second, as the second largest oil exporter, Iran’s role in ensuring stable and rea-
sonably priced oil supplies increased during the ongoing transition to a “seller’s
market” (Yergin 1992) in the late 1960s.25 The stability and friendliness of Iranian
oil policies was a long-time concern for the United States. As early as 1951, it was es-
timated that a disruption in Iran’s oil export and refinery capacity “would temporar-
ily undermine economic activity in Western Europe and impose severe economic
hardships on Great Britain even in peacetime,” requiring “at least six months . . . to
place marginal plants in operation, to change the composition of refinery output, to
alter tanker routings, and to complete the redistribution of crude oil among the
other refineries” (Randall 2005, 257–58). Although Iran rarely exercised such power
to manipulate political outcomes (including in 1973), the sheer volume of oil re-
serves and production capacity conferred undeniable power to Iran.
In 1957, President Eisenhower was prepared to “use force” (Gause 1985, 258) in a
crisis threatening the West’s access to Mideast oil. The US commitment to the safety
24By the late 1960s, the population of Iran was around 26 million, far more than the second largest state in the
region, Iraq, which had fewer than 10 million.
25It is worth noting that US reliance on Iran and the Middle East itself was relatively low. Its interest came from
the broader grand strategy needs, or the severe adverse consequences that US allies in Europe and Asia would face
should Iran decide to disrupt its oil exports. The 1973 oil shock is the most illustrative example of oil being used as
a weapon that can cause major economic, social, and political discord in and among the US and its allies.
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and friendliness of Iranian oil grew even more with the price increases during the
1960s. Under the growing structural power Iran began to yield, neither US diplomatic
leverage nor incentives to risk upsetting access to Iranian oil were easily found.
US–Iran Alliance
It is worth noting that all petrostates were subject to structural changes in the
global oil market, but not all benefited from a favorable security environment the
way Iran did. Rather, it was the interaction with the US military alliance that pro-
duced a particularly powerful moral hazard problem. The US–Iran relationship at
the time originated from the success of Operation Ajax in 1953, which was further
elevated with a mutual defense agreement in 1959. From the mid-1960s, however,
the security landscape in and around the alliance began to shift, entailing greater
military and diplomatic advantages for Iran vis-a`-vis other Gulf states.
First, the forthcoming US hegemony was sympathetic to or even supportive of
the Shah’s regional aspirations. This markedly contrasted with the British disdain
for Iran as a revisionist power, which regarded Iran’s territorial claims as a threat
to regional stability.26 Instead, the Nixon administration regarded Iran as a stable,
strong, and modernizing monarchy (Alvandi 2012, 356–60) whose foreign policy
orientation was considered largely compatible with US policy and whose leader
was deemed “our friend” (Alvandi 2012, 365). As Nixon bluntly put it, “I like him
[the Shah], I like him, and I like the country” (Conversation 2006).
The warm relationship was further coupled with a broader US strategic desire
to increase the strategic role of its allies. As manifested in the Nixon Doctrine in
1969, the United States decided to rely on local powers for regional stability and
security, which meant, in the context of the Middle East, the United States would
expect Iran to play a larger military role as a regional power to stabilize the re-
gion, secure Western interests, and deter hostile states such as Iraq and the Soviet
Union.27 Compared to the unfriendly UK hegemony, American confidence in
and reliance on Iran created a favorable security environment for the Shah to
pursue Iran’s long-held revisionist aims in the region. In the new era, there were
good grounds for the Shah to believe that the United States would not intervene
in settling territorial disputes “in Iran settling settling territorial disputes by
force”, as long as the overall stability of the region was not disturbed.
Second, as an ally with growing importance, the United States had provided
large sums of military aid and allowed Iran to buy some of the most advanced
weapons systems since as early as the 1960s. Concern over a Soviet advance,
whether realistic or exaggerated, was genuine among US policymakers through-
out the Cold War, and the aim of assisting an Iranian military build-up took the
form of providing “a defensive delaying capability against Soviet forces” (Cohen
2005). The United States provided substantial military aid, dominating Iran’s mili-
tary development until 1964 (al-Saud 2003, 24), and, with its oil-backed arms pur-
chasing power, Iran purchased some of the most sophisticated arms available
from the Western world (Pryor 1978, 59; Gause 1985, 264)28 under preferential
terms of purchase.29 As a result of continuing arms purchases, Iran rapidly
26Most of the territorial claims also happened to involve the British protected states of Bahrain, Sharjah, and
Ras al-Khaimah.
27The US policy is often termed Twin Pillars, referring to Iran and Saudi Arabia as US-supported primary guard-
ians of the Gulf. Despite the implied equal responsibility and status in name, Iran was an indisputably larger and
mightier country than Saudi Arabia in practice, and Iran was accordingly expected to play a larger military role. See
Gause (1985), Shlaim (1995, 61–62), and Al-Saud (2003, 66).
28These arms included hovercraft and tanks from Britain, F-4s from the United States, and helicopters and Sea
Killer Mk2 ship-to-ship missiles from Italy.
29“In 1970 and 1971, Washington extended credits totaling $220m to Iran for the purchase of F-4E Phantom
fighter-bombers. Some of these credits came from the Export-Import Bank, which usually refuses to finance military
sales” (Gause 1985, 264).
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transformed its mostly incompetent and weak army into “a credible deterrent
against any threat in the region” (Jensen 1985, 340) and the unrivalled power
within the region with increasing offensive capability.
Third, Iran’s reliance on US assistance for domestic stability also gradually
weakened after the mid-1960s. The chief reason was the oil price upsurge, which
placed huge oil revenues at the Shah’s disposal. With the economy developing at
an annual growth rate of 10–12 percent accompanied by an inflation rate below 2
percent (World Bank 2015), the oil rent contributed to dampening social unrest
and garnering political support for the regime.
Summary
Overall, by the time Iran decided to invade the three islands in 1971, it had by far
the most powerful military in the region and enjoyed relative stability at the do-
mestic level. The United States reinforced Iranian primacy through military aid
and the arms trade, as well as by expressing its intention to rely on Iran for main-
taining the regional balance of power.
Iran’s invasion of Abu Musa and the Tunbs took place in the absence of a revolu-
tionary history on the part of the aggressor, methodologically allowing us to isolate
the effects of Iranian alliance with the United States. Our case study strongly sug-
gests that it was the alliance structure that intensified a moral hazard problem by
which Iran’s anticipation of US inaction and tolerance fomented a highly permis-
sive atmosphere for the Shah to pursue his revisionist foreign policy. US tolerance
was derived from some of the mechanisms described in the theory: oil’s strategic
and commercial value, concern over an adversary’s access to oil, and enhanced in-
terests, all of which interacted with complex regional and temporal settings.
What of our first characteristic of alliances—deterrence by the great power pa-
tron of military retaliation against petro-aggression? In this case, US deterrence
was not necessary as the two sheikdoms were much weaker militarily and the Gulf
states were far from united, making the Iranian military sufficiently strong to re-
pel military backlashes.
Tellingly, Iran’s revisionist impulse remained unobstructed by its security ties
with the United States, which in fact grew stronger after 1971. A year after the in-
vasion of the Tunbs and Abu Musa, the restriction on Iranian arms purchases was
effectively removed, which let the Shah purchase anything he wanted short of nu-
clear weapons (Shlaim 1995, 63).30 From the US point of view, the successful inva-
sion was a manifestation of Iran’s reliability as a partner, not a threat to the
region’s security (Alvandi 2012, 365–66). Iran continued to launch militarized
conflicts throughout the 1970s, including the dispatch of its military to fight the
communist insurgency in Dhofar, Oman, between 1972 and 1979. In Iraq, Iranian
units fought in support of the Kurdish resistance, and the Shah showed little hesi-
tancy in escalating tensions with Iraq over the disputed Shatt-al waterway until
Saddam Hussein finally gave in by signing the 1975 Algiers Agreement.
While a full elaboration is beyond the scope of this paper, Iraq’s foreign policy
behavior at this time also appears to conform to our theoretical expectation, espe-
cially toward neighboring Kuwait. In March 1973, Iraq attacked the Kuwaiti bor-
der post of Al-Samitah and claimed the islands of Warba and Bubiyan as part of
efforts to fortify the geostrategically significant port and naval base of Umm Qasr
(Kelly 1974). While several factors accounted for the decision to escalate the bor-
der dispute with Kuwait, the fact that the Soviet Union–Iraq security ties were
30By the mid-1970s, Iran accounted for half of American arms sales abroad, and arms sales became the central
component in US–Iran relations (Alvandi 2012, 370) ($94.9 million in 1969, $682.8 million in 1974, $2.55 billion in
1977).
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strong in 1973 following the conclusion of the Treaty of Friendship and
Cooperation in April 1972, created a particularly favorable strategic environment
for Iraq. The Soviet Union’s military interest in Iraq was based partly on Iraqi oil
(Fukuyama 1980). Indeed, the Soviet Union scaled up military assistance before
and after the 1973 border crisis and provided diplomatic support by giving “moral
support” and by having Admiral Gorshkov and a contingent of naval ships pay a
“friendship” visit (Kelly 1974).
Conclusion
Petro-aggression is a simultaneously consequential and understudied phenome-
non in international security (Koubi et al. 2014). Indeed, petrostates with expan-
sionist or revisionist aspirations still continue to launch MIDs, including
Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabahk and Chad in the Central African Republic.
And yet these regimes do not qualify as revolutionary31; instead, their challenge
to alter the status quo may be driven in part by their substantive security relation-
ship with major powers like the United States for Azerbaijan or France for Chad.
How can petro-aggression be reduced? Seeing petro-aggression as a byproduct
of the moral hazard problem compels us to shift the focus away from domestic
politics to the broader strategic environment. Our analysis suggests that great
powers, presumably interested in preventing petro-aggressions committed by their
prote´ge´ allies and thereby avoiding being entrapped in conflicts unrelated to
commitments made for reasons of energy security, may be well advised to adopt a
combination of the following three policies recommendations.
First, great powers should make the conditions for their intervention in petros-
tates’ conflicts explicit and public. The design of the alliance matters here. Good
alliance design can lessen moral hazard problems by clearly setting out the condi-
tions under which the great power will militarily aid its oil state ally. This is not
the case for several US alliances with oil states, which are often unwritten (Saudi
Arabia) or classified (Kuwait). Some argue that strategic ambiguity can reduce the
temptation of allies to test a great power’s resolve (Benson 2012). However, as ar-
gued earlier, the presence of oil can undermine the logic of deterrence by strate-
gic ambiguity. In other words, to the extent that oil is perceived as a strategic
good, oil states are more likely to anticipate a great power’s support for their mili-
tary adventures than similar non-oil states would. To address this problem, the
United States may be well advised to make public that its commitments to oil state
allies are limited to conflicts of a defensive nature and even that revisionist aggres-
sions by its ally will be met with punitive measures such as troop withdrawals or re-
traction of military cooperation. In the context of the ongoing diversification of
global oil supplies and growing market resilience against supply shocks (Gholz
and Press 2010), bargaining leverage increasingly favors the US ability to make
these conditions credible to its petrostate allies.
Second, while alliance design allows a great power to clearly state the bounds of
its commitment up front, interactions with the ally over time can also be cali-
brated to limit the moral hazard inherent in such a relationship. A bilateral exam-
ple might concern arms sales. While great powers already take the broader
regional security context into account when making such sales, great powers con-
sidering arms sales to enhance the security of a petrostate ally should make this
context the first, if not only, priority. Increasing a petrostate ally’s ability to take
military action, defend itself, or make a military threat has special risks for the
great power that should not be run lightly for the sake of a domestic or foreign
defense establishment, a temporary boost in bilateral relations, or other minor
reasons. Multilaterally, great powers might also consider cooperating over the
31None of these states are coded as revolutionary according to Colgan (2010).
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long term to more generally reduce their level of military commitment to petros-
tate allies in the Middle East. Shared dangers can create shared interests, and
while the pressures to arm and aid petrostates are strong, a recognition of the
risks among great powers such as the United States, Russia, and China might
form the basis for an informal or formal arrangement to limit the degree of mili-
tary assistance or arms transfers.
Third, great powers can raise the cost of aggression in general. International re-
sponses can alter the political stances of petrostate patrons or, more broadly, the
costs of aggression. For instance, we suggest that even if a petrostate is run by a
revolutionary leadership such as Saddam’s Iraq or Chavez’s Venezuela, the likeli-
hood of launching MIDs may still be reduced if the petrostate sees itself as unable
to handle the possible international backlash. In that sense, the events leading up
to the Gulf War are revealing. As has been argued, had the United States been
more forthcoming in informing Saddam of America’s determined opposition
prior to the invasion of Kuwait, Saddam’s aggressive impulse might have been
moderated as direct confrontation with US forces hardly served his interests
(Mearsheimer and Walt 2003). The great power alliance status, by definition,
sends signals about the great power’s possible tolerance of a petrostate’s revision-
ist aims. Accordingly, greater policy efforts would be necessary to dissuade petros-
tates who are allied with great powers from launching MIDs. At the same time,
however, such international efforts would be a much more practical way to pre-
vent aggression than attempting to change a petrostate’s revolutionary regime.
Finally, our analysis may be subjected to modification as two competing changes
occur in the global oil trade and international system. On one hand, the United
States’ and other developed countries’ reliance on oil is declining with the prog-
ress made in alternative energy sources and the extraction technology for uncon-
ventional oils and with the posited decline of the non-Western world’s share of
global oil production. The current transformation of global oil suggests a reduc-
tion, though not total elimination, of great power commitments to petrostates.
On the other hand, with the rise of China and its thirst for energy, oil-rich regions
now interact more intensely with the potential new patron candidate. China’s ex-
pansion into oil rich African, Middle Eastern, and Latin American states is still at
an early stage, but growing military ties and nascent strategic alignments appear
irreversible to many analysts (Leverett and Bader 2005; Gao and Wang 2012).
Overall, the international security environment is being transformed around pet-
rostates, as the traditional patron, the United States, debates whether to reduce
its current military commitment to oil-rich states, while a rising China makes no
secret about its commitment to better access to oil and increased military and po-
litical ties with petrostates.
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